Public choice theory from 1377

Here.

An effective political ad

Bank failure and the financial crisis

From a book review on the financial crisis:

•When the FDIC took over Washington Mutual, it paid uninsured depositors in full using money that would have gone to bondholders. Writes Mr. Allison: "This was in complete contradiction to past practice. The bondholders suddenly realized that there is no rule of law when government regulators are involved…The decision to treat WaMu bondholders this way closed the capital markets for banks."

Another review here.

Watching light move

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2191451/The-camera-TRILLION-pictures-second--making-fast-watch-beams-light-travelling-slow-motion.html

Thanks, Illinois

Illinois, with its high tax on cigarettes, is helping fund the government of Indiana. The Laffer curve in action.

Addendum: One has to wonder why the Illinois politicians hate poor people so much. The cigarette tax is one of the most regressive taxes we have. Smoking is primarily a vice of the poor.

Does fiscal policy work?

The military buildup or World War II is often cited as a successful prediction of Keynesian economics. Usually forgotten is what happened at the end of the war. David Henderson summarizes:

In a 2010 study for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, I examined the four years from 1944, the peak of World War II spending, to 1948. Over those years, the U.S. government cut spending from a high of 44 percent of gross national product (GNP) in 1944 to only 8.9 percent in 1948, a drop of over 35 percentage points of GNP. The result was an astonishing boom. The unemployment rate, which was artificially low at the end of the war because many millions of workers had been drafted into the U.S. armed services, did increase. But between 1945 and 1948, it reached its peak at only 3.9 percent in 1946. From September 1945 to December 1948, the average unemployment rate was 3.5 percent.

There was a sharp decline in real GNP at the end of the war, but Henderson says that is an artifact of the ending of price controls. The price controls hid what the actual prices were, so the jump in the price index was not capturing a real rise in prices. But that illusion of a jump resulted in a decline in reported real GNP. (An implication of this is that real GNP was overstated during the war because the price index was not capturing the rise in prices.)

How does Henderson explain the boom?

But why did this postwar boom occur? The answer, in a nutshell, is that the U.S. economy went from being centrally planned, with price controls and government allocation in large sectors of the economy, to being much more free market. During the New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt had many advisors who were hostile to free markets. But during the war, Roosevelt, although he centrally planned the economy for the duration, kicked out most of his anti-market advisors, people like Ben Cohen, William O. Douglas, trust-buster Thurman Arnold, price controller Leon Henderson, and Felix Frankfurter. In 1945 and 1946, Harry Truman got rid of the remaining New Dealers, including two of the most prominent ones: former Vice President Henry Wallace and Harold Ickes.

Facts matter

Dierdre McCloskey argues that many assumed facts that underlie the thinking of progressive intellectuals is false. A small sample:

Unions raised wages for plumbers and auto workers but reduced wages for the non-unionized.  Minimum wages protected union jobs but made the poor unemployable.  Building codes sometimes kept buildings from falling or burning down but always gave steady work to well-connected carpenters and electricians and made housing more expensive for the poor.  Zoning and planning permission has protected rich landlords rather than helping the poor.  Rent control makes the poor and the mentally ill unhousable, because no one will build inexpensive housing when it is forced by law to be expensive.  The sane and the already-rich get the rent-controlled apartments and the fancy townhouses in once-poor neighborhoods.

 He also has a very Schumpeterian line: "Efficiency is not the chief merit of a market economy: innovation is."

Read the whole thing.

The real war on women

http://spectator.org/archives/2012/06/15/chinas-one-child-policy-two-ca

Common problems in government

An excerpt from a longer post by Jonathan Adler.

One thing that Hardin overlooked is that the political process often replicates the same economic dynamic that encourages the tragedy of the commons -- a dynamic fostered by the ability to capture concentrated benefits while dispersing the costs. Like the herder who has an incentive to put out yet one more animal to graze, each interest group has every incentive to seek special benefits through the political process, while dispersing the costs of providing those benefits to the public at large. Just as no herder has adequate incentive to withhold from grazing one more animal, no interest group has adequate incentive to forego its turn to obtain concentrated benefits at public expense. No interest group has adequate incentive to put the interests of the whole ahead of the interests of the few. The logic of collective action discourages investments in sound public policy just as it discourages investments in sound ecological stewardship. This, in addition to the pervasiveness of special-interest rent seeking, explains many of the failings of centralized regulation.

Supernovae and climate

Do exploding stars influence climate?